In response to this growing environmental crisis, the United States enacted legislation aimed at protecting the environment and environmental resources. 6 By utilizing trade regulation as its primary vehicle of motivation toward compliance, however, the effects of this new legislation soon created ripples felt across borders. 7 These events have led to tremendous discord in the international community and courts alike. Yet, to date, all such environmental laws have been challenged internationally before, and subsequently denied by, the trade authorities under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 8 Is the United States wrong to seek international environmental goals through unilateral measures? In the post-World War II era, both sides can probably appreciate the concern for and preference against such policy. Therefore, the more salient question is: Why did the United States feel it had to act in such a way, and in its alternative, how should the country plan to act in the future?
In addressing these and related issues, this Article focuses on the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) case United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 0 a landmark decision that also marks perhaps one of the most complicated and convoluted legal analyses ever rendered. While the Shrimp/Turtle decision is not lacking for criticism and commentary from the environmental and trade communities, most legal comments thus far have exhaustively focused on the perceived overbroad, or depending on one's point of view, overly narrow, and substantively incorrect interpretation of the WTO's Article XX Chapeau." Such comments are narrow-sighted and myopic in overall goals and ambition. The WTO, as the original drafter and facilitator, will interpret their international trade rules as they have intended and see fit. Therefore, perhaps a more important argument would be that the WTO, as an arbiter of international law and jurisdiction, failed to properly heed pertinent authority and customary international law in deciding Shrimp/Turtle and other decisions.
This Article contends that there must be an affirmation that trade-related environmental measures authorized under internationally recognized environmental principles and customary law are consistent with WTO rules. In particular, the application of sustainable development as a legal concept was conveniently ignored in the Appellate Body's Shrimp/Turtle ruling. Such "oversights" have evidenced the need for a more neutral forum and arbiter of international trade-environment issues. Part II outlines the plight of sea turtles in the world, paying specific attention to the remedial measures utilized by the U.S. under Section 609. Part I discusses the Shrimp/Turtle decision and the grounds for the Appellate Body's controversial ruling. Part IV attends to the concerns of the international trade community and possible arguments for why, while confusing and contradictory, the Appellate Body may have come to the right conclusion. Finally, Part IV concludes with a discussion of why unilateral measures may in fact be necessary in some instances and why critics have failed in their lack of discussion of international law and principles. Part IV will call for a more neutral arbiter of future trade-environment cases.
II. THE SEA TURTLE DILEMMA "Despite its smooth, elegant motion under water, the sea turtle has created a tremendous wake in the realms of environmental protection and free trade." 12 The conflict underlying the Shrimp/Turtle case concerns a 1989 amendment to the United States Endangered Species Act of 1973 and the so-called Section 609 that generally prohibit the importation of shrimp and shrimp products where harvesting methods are or can be employed that do not sufficiently protect the sea turtles.1 3 Discussed in more detail later, Section 609 generally provides that the importation ban will not apply to harvesting countries that are 
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certified by the U.S. government. 1 4 Certification, however, will only be granted to "either those countries with a fishing environment that does not pose a threat of incidentally taking sea turtles or to those harvesting nations that adopt a regulatory program that is comparable to or as effective as the regulatory program of the United States."' 15 In particular, the U.S. domestic program mandates the use of turtle excluder devices (TEDs), which in the actual application of the regulation became the de facto standard requirement for granting certification. 16 In 1996, the countries of India, Malaysia, and Thailand filed their first complaint with the WTO, pleading that the legislation be overturned as indicative of unfair trade practices. 17 The battle lines had been firmly drawn.
A. Factual Background
"Found in most warm water ocean environments of the world, sea turtles are long-lived air-breathing marine reptiles."' 18 As adults, sea turtles spend most of their lives at sea, only venturing to come ashore when females in each population periodically beach to lay their eggs. 19 As a result, despite their amicable appearances and relatively widespread appeal, very little is known about sea turtles.
Sea Turtles and Shrimp Trawling
In sharp contrast, "[t]he facts about sea turtles killed by shrimp trawling are well documented and generally uncontested. 2° Shrimp trawling is practiced extensively in the tropical and subtropical coastal habitats frequented by sea turtles. 2 ' Typically, the trawls are submerged long enough that most turtles incidentally caught in the nets will drown. 22 Indeed, shrimp trawling is largely recognized as the most wasteful commercial fishery in the world. 23 26. Guruswamy, supra note 20. Indicator species provide a unique and helpful analysis of the biological condition in an ecosystem. "While indicator species is a term that is often used, it is somewhat inaccurate. Indicators are actually groups or types of biological resources that can be used to assess environmental condition." Id. Nevertheless, the consistent monitoring of indicator species has proven to be an invaluable tool for the international community. It has often been used as an early warning of pollution or degradation in an ecosystem, as well as a sign of negative environmental trends. U.S. ENVTL. PROT , 1999) . IUCN, through its Species Survival Commission (SSC), has for four decades been assessing the conservation status of species, subspecies, varieties and even selected subpopulations on a global scale in order to highlight taxa threatened with extinction, and therefore promote their conservation. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species provides taxonomic, conservation status and distribution information on taxa that have been evaluated using the IUCN Red List categories and criteria. The main purpose of the IUCN Red List is to catalogue and highlight those taxa that are facing a higher risk of global extinction (i.e., those listed as Critically Endangered, Endangered and Vulnerable). However, the IUCN Red List also includes information on taxa that are categorized as Extinct or Extinct in the Wild, on taxa that cannot be evaluated because of insufficient information (i.e., are Data Deficient), and on taxa that are either close to meeting the threatened thresholds or would be threatened were it not for an ongoing taxon-specific conservation program (i.e., Near Threatened 
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Endangered Species Act. 32 Despite all of the efforts, though, at least five species of sea turtles are in imminent danger of extinction, largely due to the continued practices of the shrimping industry.
3 3
The United States Responds
Concerned by the decline in the sea turtle population due to shrimp trawling, in 1981, Congress instructed the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to begin an extensive research project to develop alternative methods of shrimp trawling that would not dramatically increase the cost to shrimpers while still protecting the sea turtles. 34 This research culminated in the development of the Turtle Excluder Device (TED). The TED is a metal grid of bars attached to a shrimp trawling net. It has an opening at either the top or the bottom, which creates a hatch allowing sea turtles and other large animals incidentally caught in the nets to escape while keeping the shrimp inside. However, despite their efforts to distribute TEDs to shrimp fishermen and to instruct them how to properly employ the devices, the NMFS was unable to induce enough fishermen to voluntarily use the TEDs to significantly affect the turtle mortality rates due to concerns over a reduction in the catch. 36 Therefore, in response to the NMFS's failed attempt to induce shrimpers to voluntarily adopt the use of TEDs, the U.S. Department of Commerce initiated a series of steps designed to increase compliance. First, it imposed strict regulations on the United States domestic shrimp fleet, eventually mandating the use of TEDs.
3 7 Soon after, motivated largely out of concern that the new requirements would weaken their competitive position vis-A-vis shrimpers from countries not using TEDs, American shrimpers protested vehemently against the TED regulation. 3 Section 609 was drafted to contain a "carrot" and a "stick" that would together serve to extend sea turtle protection beyond the limited confines of U.S. waters and its exclusive economic zone. 4 ' As Sanford Gaines of the University of Pennsylvania explains:
The carrot, Section 609(a), calls upon the departments of state and commerce to initiate negotiation of agreements with other countries "for the protection and conservation of sea turtles," specifically including all governments with jurisdiction over commercial fishing operations that "may affect adversely such species of sea turtles." The stick comes in Section 609(b), which prohibits, after May 1, 1991, the import of wild-caught shrimp "which have been harvested with commercial fishing technology which may affect adversely such species of sea turtles."" 2
In a controversial twist, however, Section 609 allowed for an exception to the importation ban alluded to in 609(b). Exporting nations were deemed to be exempted from the prohibition of 609(b) if "certified" by the President based on "documentary evidence of the adoption of a regulatory program governing the incidental taking of such sea turtles in the course of such harvesting that is comparable to that of the United States" and an average rate of incidental take of turtles comparable to the U.S. average. 4 3 Congress otherwise implemented a unilateral ban on the importation of shrimp products from non-complying countries. 44 Section 609(b) clearly provided for more aggressive efforts to prevent the sea turtle's potentially imminent extinction. 
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measures adopted by Congress in Section 609(b) served as the catalyst for both national and international litigation. 45
The Proper Scope of Section 609
Over the next decade, several different sets of guidelines were introduced to feel out and properly implement the turtle protection legislation. 46 In 1991 and 1993, the first two sets of guidelines issued by the State Department were promulgated under Section 609. 47 These guidelines included two major provisions. First, in addressing the comparability of foreign regulatory programs, the guidelines mandated the use of TEDs on all shrimping vessels where there was a likelihood of intercepting sea turtles. 48 The only exceptions applied to vessels less than twenty-five feet in length, which were allowed to comply by reducing towing times. 49 Secondly, the State Department determined that Congress intended that the scope of Section 609 be limited in application to the Caribbean and western Atlantic region. 5°A lthough the scope of the guidelines was expanded to affect the trawling practices of fishermen both domestically and abroad, according to some environmental groups, its limited Caribbean/western Atlantic application still ran contrary to the ESA's goal of protecting sea turtles.
5 ' In 1995, environmental NGOs challenged before the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) the decision of the State Department to limit the statute's coverage. 52 The CIT held that the prior guidelines were not a proper enforcement of Section 609. 53 The Court further directed the State Department to summarily prohibit the import of shrimp from any country in the world utilizing commercial shrimping practices that endanger those protected species of sea turtles. 54 In 1996, in response to the CIT's decision, the State Department made sweeping changes to the guidelines, and extended the import ban on shrimp and shrimp products throughout the world. Article XX thus offers general exceptions from international trade obligations for trade measures employed in the pursuit of certain specified goals or 58 purposes.
However, several countries (specifically India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand) did not view the United States' actions or goals as particularly laudable, and on October 8, 1996, following the decision of the Court of International Trade and the revised 1996 guidelines, the complainants made a formal request for consultations through the WTO. 59 The complainants alleged that the U.S. restrictions on the importation of shrimp violated Articles 1:1, XI:I, and XHI:I of GATT 1994. In addition, the complainants argued that Section 609 did not qualify under the exceptions of Article XX(b) or XX(g). On February 25, 1997, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body referred the matter to a dispute settlement panel, and the battle was officially underway. 
Ell. THE SHRIMP/TURTLE DECISION

A. The Panel Report
In the Shrimp/Turtle dispute, the complainant countries were clearly annoyed by the perception that U.S. certification regulations were being used to strong-arm other nations' domestic policies. In particular, the Asian delegations addressed the concern that Section 609 was arbitrary and that countries should not be allowed to impose unilateral measures affecting trade regardless of the environmental grounds. 6 ' On April 6, 1998, the complainants' desires came to fruition. 62 On that date, the WTO dispute panel issued its final report, holding that the importation ban imposed by the United States under Section 609 could not be justified and, in fact, operated as a restriction on trade prohibited by that article. 63 Succinctly stated, the panel ultimately examined the measure with regard to the chapeau of Article XX, which prohibits application of measures that would constitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail." 64 Believing that the exceptions in Article XX were limited and conditional, the panel found that Section 609 did indeed violate the chapeau of Article XX, and therefore found no need to address whether the measure fell under any of the exceptions. 65 On July 13, 1998, the 61. Puls, supra note 25, at 356. 62. Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 10, at para. 112. The Appellate Body paraphrased and further cast light upon the panel's reading of the chapeau: [I] f an interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX were to be followed which would allow a Member to adopt measures conditioning access to its market for a given product upon the adoption by exporting Members of certain policies, including conservation policies, GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement could no longer serve as a multilateral framework for trade among Members as security and predictability of trade relations under those Agreements would be threatened. This follows because, if one WTO Member were allowed to adopt such measures, then other Members would also have the right to adopt similar measures on the same subject but with differing, or even conflicting, requirements. Id. "Indeed, as each of these requirements would necessitate the adoption of a policy applicable not only to export production... but also domestic production, it would be impossible for a country to adopt one of those policies without the risk of breaching other Members' conflicting policy requirements for the same product and being refused access to these other markets." Id.
63. Id. The panel determined that because Section 609 banned the importation of shrimp and shrimp products from any country not meeting the United States's rigid criteria, it constituted an impermissible "prohibition or restriction" under Article XI: 1. The panel failed to see the need to address the WTO complainants' arguments that Section 609 also violated Articles 1: 1 and XIII: 1 since it had already found that it violated Article XI: 1. Benedini 
Procedural Overview of the Appellate Body Report
Initially, the Appellate Body established the proper sequence for carrying out an analysis under Article XX. In contrast to the Panel's "chapeau-down" approach, the Appellate Body held that the structure and logic of Article XX analysis requires an initial determination of whether or not the violating measure qualifies under one of the specific exceptions in Article XX(a) through 0). 69 Only then can the application of the broad language of the chapeau be used to strike down the measure. 70 Therefore, the Shrimp/Turtle case posed for the WTO the fundamental question of how the general exceptions, as articulated under Article XX, qualify for and fit into the overall purposes of a multilateral trading system.
Substantive Analysis a. Article XX(g)
Having determined that the Panel's "chapeau-down" approach was incorrect, the Appellate Body subsequently considered, per the agreement of the parties, whether Section 609 was justified under any of the exceptions of trading system balances competing values-saw the GATT as a regime dedicated to the triumph of free trade over all other human concerns. Article XX-in particular, XX(g). 7 1 Noting the global effort and interest in the protection of living natural resources, the Appellate Body proceeded on these grounds, positing that measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources, whether living or nonliving, may fall within Article XX(g). 72 Under its Article XX(g) analysis, the Appellate Body concluded that sea turtles were an exhaustible natural resource 73 and that Section 609's aim was sufficiently related to the legitimate policy of sea turtle preservation. 74 Thus, having found Section 609 to be within the meaning of Article XX(g), the Appellate Body proceeded to the most controversial step of alldeciding whether Section 609 satisfied the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.
b. The Infamous Chapeau of Article XX
The Appellate Body's analysis of Article XX(g) is notable for both the legalistic methods it applied and the results it yielded. 75 Fulfillment of the requirements of Article XX(g), however, provides only for a provisional 76 justification of compliance. All examined regulations must also stand up to the mandate of the introductory clauses, or chapeau, of Article XX. 77 The chapeau interjects two general requirements into the otherwise absolute provision that "nothing in this Agreement" shall prevent the adoption 71. Article XX(g) was used because of the less harsh language it entailed. Instead of the "necessary" language of (b), (g) only specified that the measure be "related to" the protection of natural resources. Benedini, supra note 34, at 447.
72. Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 10, at para. 127. 73. According to the complainants, this definition of "exhaustible natural resources" represented the understanding common at the time that the original GATT was drafted in 1947. Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 10, at para. 128. The incorporation of GATT into the WTO framework in 1994 created a new interpretive context that the Appellate Body was bound to follow. Primarily, the Appellate Body referred to the textual interpretation of Article XX in finding that the term "exhaustible" does not exclude "renewable" resources like living animals. Id. The Appellate Body noted that the treaty must be read "in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment." Id. Therefore, the Body concluded the language of the treaty is not "static," but "by definition evolutionary." Id. Moreover, the Body acknowledged that the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1992 Agenda 21, the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals include "living," "biological," or "natural" resources in their scope. Id. See generally Bree, supra note 13.
74. ShrimpTurtle, supra note 10, at para. 142. The "related to" analysis focuses on the necessary relationship between the general structure and design of Section 609 and the conservation of sea turtles. The rationality test of sub-paragraph (g) is much broader than the necessity test of sub-paragraph (b), which requires that the only action that will be justified under (b) is the imposition of the least-trade-restrictive alternative. In contrast, the rationality test requires only "a close and genuine relationship of ends and means." The Appellate Body found that Section 609 did, in fact, have a sufficient relationship to the legitimate policy of conserving sea turtles. Dailey 
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of measures to achieve the policy goals enumerated in Article XX(a) through 0).78 Specifically, it requires that measures not be applied in a manner which would constitute: (1) a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between two countries where the same conditions prevail, or (2) a disguised restriction on international trade. 79 While, in general, the parties to the Shrimp/Turtle dispute, the WTO, and environmental groups agree that the chapeau is designed to prevent the abuse of Article XX exceptions, the exact .meaning and application intended by the ambiguous language of the dual requirements is a point of major contention. 
i. Unjustifiable and Arbitrary Discrimination
The Appellate Body first examined Section 609 with regard to the prohibition against unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination.
83 This is where Section 609 ran afoul of Article XX. 84 In its holding that the unilateral legislation did unjustifiably and arbitrarily discriminate, the Appellate Body 85 elicits several factors that led to this conclusion.
According to the Appellate Body, the "most conspicuous flaw" in the application of Section 609 was its coercive effect. 86 While the statutory language of Section 609 did not mandate a change in policy by foreign governments, the Appellate Body believed that the practical application of the statute had removed any ostensible degree of flexibility toward compliance. 87 In particular, the Appellate Body pointed to the 1996 guidelines that had described only one manner in which a regulatory program could be considered comparable to the U.S. program. 88 [Vol. 15.3 SHRIMP/TURTLE DECISION that measures must take into account different conditions in the territories of other Members. 89 The second and perhaps most substantively important aspect of the debate was what the Appellate Body referred to as the unilateral character of the measure's application." Many legal pundits believe this was essentially the defining swing-vote in Section 609's analysis. 9 ' Indeed, the Appellate Body strongly criticized the failure of the United States to engage... [the appellees, as well as] other Members exporting shrimp to the United States, in serious, across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of sea turtles, before enforcing the import prohibition against the shrimp exports of those other Members. 9 2
As support for the appropriateness of such multilateral action, the Appellate Body cited to a series of international environmental and WTO environment related items, as well as to Section 609 itself. 93 In addition, the Appellate Body bolstered its preference for multilateral negotiation by citing to the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, a multi-national convention negotiated by the United States with some of the affected countries for the protection and conservation of sea turtles. 94 In its report, the Appellate Body extolled the Convention as a model for available multilateral alternatives. 95 Ironically, the Body used the United States's one multilateral success under Section 609 as an exhibit of the perceived greater failure in producing similar agreements with other Members.
Id. (quoting the
/Turtle decision, supra note 10). It was unjustified, as the Appellate Body suggests, because other measures more acceptable to the exporting country might have achieved the legitimate conservation objective of the United States. Furthermore, the scheme as applied barred imports of shrimp caught with TEDs merely because they were caught in waters of countries not certified by the United States. Taken together, these two features of the scheme's application led to a conclusion of unjustified discrimination. The Appellate Body feared that the scheme's paramount concern was influencing WTO members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory regime as that applied by the United States to its domestic shrimpers. 
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Finally, the Appellate Body detected that differential treatment was being given to various countries desiring certification. 96 The Body specifically referred to disparities in the length of phase-in period and in the transfer of TED technology to specific countries. 97 
ii. Disguised Restriction on International Trade
The Appellate Body did not specifically address the issue of whether the statute, in fact, constituted a "disguised restriction on international trade." 98 Therefore, the Appellate Body declared that it was enough that the measure be held inconsistent with Article XX because Section 609 constituted both unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination. However, the practical application of such an assertion is open for debate. While the Appellate Body's decision in Shrimp/Turtle appears to open the door to unilateral national environmental measures under Article XX(g), that "open door only leads to a second and more tightly guarded gateway, the Article XX chapeau."' ' 0 2 Therefore, the arguments of earlier cases condemning unilateral measures under Article XX seem to have merely transferred bases from the interpretation of the exceptions to the interpretation of the chapeau. Was the Appellate Body correct? Can or should sovereign States be able to unilaterally effectuate environmental goals through the channels of trade? Opinions on this matter have led to a groundswell of legal comments and theory.
99
C. Unilateral Environmental Measures in the Wake of the Shrimp/Turtle Decision
IV. THE ANATOMY OF A TRADE-RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURE
Often overlooked in judicial decisions is the reaction of the party in whose favor the case has been decided. Yet the mere possibility that unilateral trade measures may be allowed in the future has the international trade community up in arms.
10 3 However, it is important to note that most analyses of the ShrimpTurtle decision come from journals and publications not-socoincidentally entitled with such names as "Journal of Environmental Law" and "Environmental Law Reporter.
1°4
Therefore, was the Appellate Body's interpretation of the chapeau in Shrimp/Turtle as egregious as advertised? Was the United States the good and noble Defender of Wildlife it was portrayed to be? Such matters warrant a closer look.
policies (although covered in principle by one or another of the exceptions) prescribed by the importing country, renders a measure a priori incapable of justification under Art. XX. Such an interpretation renders most, if not all, of the specific exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the principles of interpretation we are bound to apply. Id. at para. 121.
102. Gaines, supra note 18, at 743. 103. A fairly representative criticism is that of Jagdish Baghwati of Columbia University: I have some sympathy for [the] view that the dispute settlement panels and the appellate court must defer somewhat more to the political process instead of making law in controversial matters. I was astounded that the appellate court, in effect, reversed long-standing jurisprudence on process and production methods in the Shrimp-Turtle case. I have little doubt that the jurists were reflecting the political pressures brought by the rich-country environmental NGOs and essentially made law that affected the developing countries adversely. Jagdish Bhagwati, 
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A. Trade and the Environment
To fully appreciate the nature of the WTO's current predicament over Article XX, one must recall the contentious decade of trade versus environment debate preceding the Shrimp/Turtle decision. 0 5 "In 1991, a dispute settlement panel report [unwittingly] thrust trade law abruptly into the realm of environmental policy, and, in so doing, placed environmental issues squarely on the agenda of international trade policy and development."'0 6 The resulting aftershock from the report created ripples throughout the environmental and trade communities alike. 0 7 Environmentalists portrayed the world trade system as "GATTzilla," while trade advocates predicted a period of veiled trade restrictions and "green" protectionism that threatened to revert the international community back to the chaos that embroiled the 1930s.' 0 8
Still, optimism fueled the hope that the worlds of trade and environment could find a common ground that would be mutually beneficial to both of their interests. 1 0°9 The GATT soon had created a Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade (EMIT), later restructured in 1995 as the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE)." 0 In addition, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development studied issues viewed as germane to the trade versus environment debate through a series of meetings of an ad hoc group called the Joint Session of Trade and Environment Experts."' Academic studies and conferences addressing trade and the environment proliferated."
Conflicts over trade and the environment continue to arise and need to be resolved. Given the absence of official negotiations toward new policy approaches, governments in most such cases have had no option but to resort to the dispute settlement process of the GATT/WTO. Not surprisingly, most of these cases have met with very little success toward their environmentallybased objectives. Nevertheless, while some critics contend the ShrimpfTurtle case has made unprecedented inroads into state sovereignty (actually, the sovereignty of the United States, to be more exact) and the conservation and protection of the environment, the final decision of the Appellate Body may merit some support.
B. Were the United States' Efforts Genuinely Environmentally Motivated?
Harnessing memories from their first year of law school, many lawyers will recall a standing case entitled Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 116 The moniker "Defenders of Wildlife" conjures up a sort of haughty imagery. What kind of organization would call itself the Defenders of Wildlife? Who, in fact, were the Defenders of Wildlife? To listen to some of the critiques of Shrimp/Turtle, 17 this venerable title had vested in the United States of America, attained as a result of its visionary environmental legislation-Section 609. Nonetheless, were the United States's efforts in ShrimpTurtle genuinely environmentally motivated, and should it matter if they were not?
After all, "according to a recent status report to the WTO, the United States has 'redoubled its efforts . . .to negotiate an agreement with the governments of the Indian Ocean region towards the protection of sea turtles in that region."' 11 8 The report further stated that several governments as well as NGOs had already been approached in an effort to get the negotiations process underway toward a more effective multilateral treaty.
1 9 These findings beg the question: Why was this option not implemented from the very beginning? In fact, the global shrimp industry is one of the highest-valued seafood industries in the world, and the United States is one of the largest consumers of shrimp, typically importing about 75 percent of the shrimp that it consumes.120 Therefore, it may be, as one author contends, that the United States, by imposing restrictions on imported shrimp, hoped to limit foreign competition in favor of its domestic shrimp industry.1 2 1 Suspicion in the neutral eye is inevitable. The facts materialize themselves as the classic case of protectionism. As Peter Chessick describes, "[a]fter the domestic TEDs regulations were in place, unhappy Trawlers in the Gulf of Mexico, forced to put TEDs in their nets, found themselves trawling alongside Mexican Trawlers who were subject to no such requirements, yet who could sell their presumably larger catches for the same price."' 22 So, perhaps not so coincidentally, in 1989, less than two years after the Department of Commerce first required the use of TEDs by U.S. shrimpers, Congress passed the amendment to the Endangered Species Act known as Section 609.123 In fact, when Section 609 was finally implemented in 1991, the State Department issued guidelines that directed efforts to enforce subparagraph (b)'s restrictions on only 14 of the 85 countries exporting shrimp to the U.S., and those efforts led to further actions against only one country: Mexico. 24 Furthermore, Section 609 itself was proposed by members of Congress from states bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, which is by far the greatest source of domestic shrimp (and shrimpers) in the United States.1 25 The environmental lobby had very little influence on the development of the legislation, and it did not become deeply involved in the Section 609 debate until the 1991 guidelines were released.1
26
C. The International Trade Community's Argument
So, after the dust settled, who was the real "winner" and who was the real "loser" in the Shrimp/Turtle case? The answer may not be patently obvious. After all, government representatives from Thailand and India have asserted that, from their point of view, the United States really "won" due to what they perceived as the Appellate Body's broad reading of the Article XX exceptions.
27 "As with so many matters in the law, the practical result for the parties to the case is, for many purposes, secondary to its significance as legal discourse and potential precedent.' ' 28 122. Id. at 515. [Vol. 15.3
Specifically, the international trade community protests the ShrimpiTurtle holding in the sense that it leaves the door cracked open for countries to unilaterally impose extraterritorial trade restrictions based on individual, domestic agendas-perhaps more importantly-without necessitating changes to the WTO rules.' 29 As Alan Oxley, former Australian Ambassador to the GATI' and former Chairman of the GATT Contracting Parties, exclaimed:
This judgment of the Appellate Body follows the example set by the most activist of the U.S. Supreme Court judges. It has interpreted WTO provisions to permit restrictions which the membership of the WTO has previously indicated, overwhelmingly and emphatically, they do not support.... There is now an urgent need to quarantine or, better, reverse, the opening for widespread imposition of trade restrictions on environmental grounds which the AB has now legitimized. Given the Appellate Body's corresponding interpretation of the chapeau, however, such fears may be more alarmist than real. Nevertheless, through all of the discussion, accusations, and conjecture, one cannot help but wonder: Regardless of the complete purity of motive, should unilateral measures ever be allowed if a salient, environmental reason for such measures can be legitimately shown to exist?
D. Unilateral Measures May Be Necessary
There are essentially two types of environmental trade measures: multilateral and unilateral. This distinction is paramount because the WTO has consistently favored the use of multilateral environmental trade measures over 129 
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unilateral environmental measures that propose the same goals.' 31 These sentiments were echoed in recent comments by Renato Ruggiero, former Director-General of the WTO:
We both want a strong, rules-based trading system as well as a strong and effective environmental system, and we both want the two systems to support one another. The question is how do we arrive at these objectives. We will not arrive there through unilateralism, through discriminatory actions and protectionism, with each nation free to impose its standards and priorities on the other following its own perceptions of the problem. On the contrary, we will only arrive at our shared objectives through consensus, through negotiations.
132
Indeed, international environmental law and policy has expressed a preference for multilateral treaties and negotiations, as well.1 3 3 The reasons are really quite obvious. Attending to such global threats as species extinction, multilateral cooperation, and parity is seen as more effective and equitable than unilateral measures, which can slant the playing field in the direction of Northern power and open the door to serious abuses. After all, in the current state of the world, the line between economics and environment is often blurred, and the color of environmental trade measures is very rarely black or white.
Despite this pronounced desirability for multilateral treaties, and the fact that the United States may not have been as genuinely environmentally motivated as it was portrayed to have been, there are problems with pursuing a 131. The Appellate Body has acknowledged that the task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of other Members under varying substantive provisions of the GATT, so that neither of the competing rights will cancel out the other. Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 10; see also [Vol. 15.3 SHRIMP/TURTLE DECISION negotiated multilateral solution to environmental threats. In the absence of an international judicial system that provides a comprehensive and neutral dispute resolution body able to blindly cover conflicts such as the Shrimp/Turtle dispute, unilateral measures may be necessary to protect a species' already delicate status.
No Time for Multilateral Inefficiencies
Environmental threats present somewhat unique phenomena. In general, by the time the environmental threats gain public attention, the situation has attained advanced status, and the need for a cogent solution has become critical. 134 Therefore, there is often little room for error and no time to waste. Curiously, these are exactly the results multilateral negotiations threaten to produce.
International negotiations are usually long, complex, expensive, and highly politicized processes. 135 As Robert Howse observed:
In a world where bargaining imposes transaction costs, cooperative solutions will be affected by background legal rules that establish rights or entitlements on which the parties can rely in the absence of negotiated agreement. It is possible that a rule that is highly restrictive of unilateral trade measures to protect the environment will lead to strategic behavior, and exacerbate hold-out problems, thereby increasing transaction costs and reducing the likelihood of cooperative solutions to global environmental problems. 136 Perhaps more importantly, by the time the countries can find an agreement that is copasetic to all parties, the species in question may be extinct.
Absence of an Impartial Forum 137
Similarly, unilateral measures may become necessary due to the absence of an impartial forum. As mentioned earlier, the lack of an international judicial system with a less specialized purpose and a more comprehensive and neutral dispute settlement body has led to conflict and divergent policies within the international community. Was the Appellate Body wrong in concluding that the United States may have discriminated against certain countries in the Shrimp/Turtle case under the guise of environmental protection? Probably not. Nevertheless, would a more neutral arbiter have come to a different decision? This question is a more difficult one to answer, but this Article argues "yes."
a. The "T" Stands for Trade
The simple fact remains: The GATT/WTO regime is first and foremost a trade organization. 138 Its Dispute Panels and Appellate Body consist almost exclusively of trade experts and free trade advocates.
1 39 Nevertheless, without a fully evolved international court system, environmental measures disputed for their effect on trade must still come before a WTO Dispute Panel and, if appealed, before a WTO Appellate Body. 14° Needless to say, this process hardly presents the image of impartiality.
So, why would a more neutral arbiter have decided any differently? For one thing, the Appellate Body ignored pertinent customary international law, not the least of which was the principle of sustainable development, and in so doing, showed little understanding for how environmental policy works.
b. The Appellate Body Exhibited Ignorance to the Principle of Sustainable Development
Most negative critiques of the Shrimp/Turtle decision have focused on the perceived incorrect interpretation and application of GATT Article XX and its exceptions. As discussed above, however, the WTO owes its existence and devotes its loyalty to the insurance of fair trade. Therefore, it is to be expected, as well as encouraged, that the WTO interpret their rules and regulations in this light. After all, outside of the gambit of Shrimp/Turtle, the WTO performs necessary and laudable functions. Who is more privy to the meaning and intent of such rules and regulations than the original drafter and facilitator? Where the Appellate Body treads more clumsily, though, is in its display of ignorance toward pertinent customary international law, particularly the concept of sustainable development. Indeed, it is this ignorance that represents the less forgivable offense and better displays the need for a more impartial forum.
Professor Birnie has indicated that the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case shows us that "a treaty may also have to be interpreted and applied in light of customary international law, including new environmental law.' 41 [Vol. 15.3 SHRIMP/TURTLE DECISION Birnie acknowledges that how courts resolve the potential for conflict between simultaneously applicable principles or norms in international disputes is essentially a matter of judicial technique, she also points out that the case law of the International Court suggests that where possible it "prefers an integrated conception of international law to a fragmented one."' ' 42 "Apart from highlighting the formative role of international courts in determining the applicable law, this conclusion points again to the [tenuous practice] of viewing any part of international law in isolation from the whole.' 43 Admittedly, contentious debate surrounds whether or not the principle of sustainable development has risen to the level of customary international law. Nevertheless, at least one court and more than a few legal commentators have espoused its status as such. 144 Even so, in referencing and applying sustainable development throughout the body and preamble to its constitutive agreement, the WTO may have incorporated the principle into GATT and, moreover, possibly raised its status concerning Shrimp/Turtle to that of the binding law of treaties.
The guidelines for interpreting treaties are given in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 1 45 Article 3 1 (1) stipulates that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."' 46 The Convention later specifies the need that the treaty be interpreted as a whole, "including its preamble and annexes.
' ' " 4 Therefore, in seeking to understand and apply the meaning of a GATT provision, for example, it may not be enough to look only to the text of the particular provision.
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